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Abstract
Research and development (R&D) collaborations, common in high-tech industries, are
challenging to manage due to technical and market risks as well as incentive problems. We
investigate how control rights, options, payment terms and timing allow the innovator to
capture maximum value from its R&D collaborations with a marketer. Our study reveals a
counterintuitive result; the innovator may, under certain conditions, prefer to grant launch
control rights or buy-out options to the marketer despite the fact that both terms restrict its
downstream actions. We demonstrate that a menu of contracts is not necessary to address the
adverse selection problem as the menu can be replicated by a single option contract. We show
that timing, through renegotiation or delayed contracting, as well as the careful allocation
of control rights and options can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the value of collaborative
R&D. We provide recommendations on the optimal contract structure and timing based on
two project characteristics, novelty of the R&D process and market-potential variability.
Key words : Research & Development; Innovation; Contract Design; Moral Hazard
1 Introduction
Partnerships for research and development (R&D) projects are common to many research-
intensive industries. Such collaborations can improve the value obtained from projects as
diﬀerent partners bring diﬀerent skills to the partnership. For instance, in the pharmaceutical
industry, biotechnology companies often hold innovative product ideas and patents, but lack
the ﬁnancial and marketing capabilities to complete their projects successfully. Conversely,
large pharmaceutical ﬁrms, who do have those capabilities, are on the lookout for patents
they can in-license from biotechnology ﬁrms, both because their existing blockbuster patents
are on the verge of expiry and due to declining internal R&D productivity (Pharma Deals
Review 2011). In the third quarter of 2014 alone, 125 agreements were signed with a total
value exceeding $11 billion (Anderson 2014).
Despite their enticing beneﬁts, R&D collaborations are fraught with uncertainties about
the extent of their success. The presence of such uncertainties often results in complex
contract structures, such as the inclusion of control rights and options (Lerner and Merges
1998; Elfenbein and Lerner 2003). Both control rights and options allow their holder to react
to new information that resolves some of the uncertainty concerning the project. Control
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rights refer to contract clauses that confer the right to make decisions unilaterally about
whether and how to pursue further investment in the product. Options may include the right
of one partner to buy out the other and take full ownership of the project at a predeﬁned
price. Eﬀective licensing contracts should also provide the appropriate incentives for the
partners to invest in R&D and marketing. These investments have a signiﬁcant impact on
the product value but are hard to specify and monitor as they involve highly complex tasks in
an uncertain and shifting environment (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Hart and Moore 1999).
Of similar importance is the innovator's decision on when to seek a partner: it impacts
both the information available at the time of the agreement and the relative quality of the
information available for the two parties involved. As uncertainties are resolved over time,
postponing or revisiting the contracting decision may simplify the contract structure and
improve performance.
In this paper, we study the eﬀects of contract structure and timing on eﬀorts for and
success of R&D collaborations between two partners who combine diﬀerent expertise: one
partner (the innovator) specializes in R&D, whereas the other partner (the marketer) invests
exclusively in marketing activities such as advertising and establishing wider distribution
networks. This is a stylized form of a situation that often occurs in practice, where an
innovator (she) has the technical know-how to create a product, and a marketer (he) brings
the product to market. When the product appeals to a niche market and does not require
vast distribution networks, an innovator may also be able to commercialize the product on
her own, but at a cost disadvantage compared to the marketer, due to lack of experience in
marketing. Our study focuses on contract clauses that are often found in R&D collaboration
agreements; the right to decide whether to launch the product or terminate the agreement,
as well as a buy-out or buy-back option. For each of these possible contract clauses, we ﬁnd
the payment terms that will maximize the innovator's value. Next, we also study the optimal
timing of the contracting decision given this complex contract structure. More speciﬁcally,
we investigate both contracting at the marketing stage and the case of upfront contracting
with downstream renegotiation.
Existing literature has optimized the contractual payment termssuch as ﬁxed fees, roy-
alties and option pricesfor diﬀerent licensor and licensee characteristics and relationships,
but always within a pre-speciﬁed contract structure. We take an overarching view of the
licensing phenomenon and attempt to consolidate and build on existing knowledge by jointly
optimizing the licensing contract structure and parameters in a setting with collaborative
eﬀorts and a model of the R&D process reﬂecting the heterogeneity of R&D projects. We
investigate how an innovator should optimize the payment terms, the allocation of control
rights and options and the timing of the contracting decision to capture maximum value
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from the collaboration with the marketer. We identify two factors which should guide both
the choice of the contract structure and the timing of the licensing decision: the type of
R&D process and the variability in the product's market potential.
The output of the R&D process is the extent to which a product is successful, ranging from
failure to generate a viable product as the worst-case scenario, to the creation of a mediocre
product (low market-potential outcome) or a blockbuster product (high market-potential
outcome). We deﬁne market-potential variability as the gap between the values of the low and
high market-potential outcomes. The size of this gap increases with consumers' sensitivity
to product attributes. The higher the sensitivity, the higher the penalty for not meeting
expectations on all product attributes. With respect to the type of the R&D process, we
distinguish between novel and incremental processes. When the R&D process is novel, such
as when a company aims to ﬁnd a new mechanism of action to target a disease, additional
R&D eﬀorts increase the chance of both the low and high market-potential outcomes while
reducing the chance of failure. In the example above, these R&D eﬀort could encompass
target identiﬁcation, lead discovery and optimization as well as the design of appropriate
clinical trials. When the R&D is incremental, e.g., R&D eﬀorts are focused on modifying
existing active compounds that work through a known physiological pathway to identify a
safer and more eﬀective drug or new disease indications, additional eﬀorts in R&D increase
the probability of a high market-potential outcome while reducing the probability of the low
market-potential outcome. Thus in the former case, R&D eﬀort is more eﬀective at raising
the overall probability of success than in the latter.
We ﬁnd that both the type of the R&D process and the variability of the market-potential
determine which type of control rights and options allow the innovator to extract maximum
value from an innovation while partnering with a marketer.
R&D Process Type
Incremental Novel
Market-Potential
Low Delayed/Renegotiation Innovator launch control
Variability High Marketer launch control Buy-out contract
Table 1: Optimal contract structure
We now describe some examples of each quadrant in Table 1.1 In 2011, Genentech and
FORMA Therapeutics signed an agreement aiming to ﬁnd a new mechanism of action to
1Note that some combinations of product characteristics are more likely to occur. For instance, one might
expect that novel R&D is more frequently associated with high market-potential variability (bottom right
quadrant) and incremental research with low market-potential variability (top left quadrant).
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starve tumors, with the stated ambition to address intractable targets. In this project, the
R&D process entails the identiﬁcation of suitable molecules that would attach to cancer cells
and the subsequent optimization of these molecules while minimizing safety concerns. At
the same time, the number of potential targets adds uncertainty about which of them might
be successfully addressed and makes market potential more diﬃcult to predict. Together,
these factors indicate a novel project with high market-potential variability. The agreement
contained a buy-out option for Genentech, allowing it to acquire all rights to the program
via a ﬁxed payment.
In the same year, Sam Amer and Ventrus Biosciences signed an agreement to collaborate
on the investigation of the eﬃcacy of a known mechanism of action, by adapting drug delivery
to and designing clinical tests for an as yet oﬀ-label indication with a well-deﬁned market,
hemorrhoidsan incremental innovation with low market-potential variability. The royalty
rate was renegotiated down at a later date.
Novartis and Paratek Pharmaceuticals' 2009 agreement described drug candidate PTK0796
as derived from another class of antibiotics. Thus, R&D eﬀorts attempt to ﬁnd the most
promising compound in that class that will be safer and more eﬀective than those currently
on the market. Despite the incremental nature of the R&D process, antibiotics face un-
certainty about whether the targeted bacteria will develop resistance to existing/competing
antibiotics. This leads to high market-potential variability. The agreement was terminated
by marketer Novartis, not on technical concerns as demonstrated by the fact that Paratek
continued development, indicating a contract with marketer launch control. These contract
structures match with the prescriptions of Table 1.
Lastly, consider the agreement signed between Allos Pharmaceuticals and Mundipharma
in 2011. Allos Pharmaceuticals had obtained a fast-track designation for the drug candidate
Folotyn pralatrexate prior to the agreement. The Fast Track designation is awarded to
drugs [that] treat serious conditions and ﬁll an unmet medical need. As a drug ﬁlling
an unmet need, if approved, the drug would face little market-potential variability. R&D
eﬀorts for Folotyn pralatrexate involved a identifying a novel mechanism of action selectively
entering cancer cells over-expressed in a certain protein. Although we do not have access to
the contract details between Allos and Mundipharma, we posit that it would beneﬁt from
innovator launch control based on the project's characteristics.2
R&D process type and market-potential variability aﬀect the optimal contract choice
because these two project characteristics interact with the contract structure and payment
terms. The innovator exploits these interactions to manage three distinct eﬃciency losses:
2We acknowledge that other factors also play a role in the contracting decision which may lead to a
diﬀerent contract structure.
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suboptimal R&D eﬀort, suboptimal marketing eﬀort, and launch by the innovator with
higher marketing costs (launch ineﬃciency). As we will demonstrate, a novel project with
low market-potential variability is mainly susceptible to launch and marketing eﬀort inef-
ﬁciencies. This makes contracts with innovator launch control attractive as the marketer
always launches the product and marketing eﬀorts are not distorted by royalties. An incre-
mental project with high market-potential variability is susceptible to R&D eﬀort ineﬃciency.
Marketer launch control creates incentives for R&D eﬀort by placing a high prize on the high
market-potential outcome. When a project is incremental and has low-market potential vari-
ability it is susceptible to all three contract ineﬃciencies. In such cases, it helps to either
delay contracting until more information is available or to renegotiate an upfront contract
to avoid ineﬃciencies. Lastly, a buy-out contract balances eﬀects of all ineﬃciencies and is
suitable for all other R&D projects.
2 Literature Review
We draw on literature from three diﬀerent areas: the analysis of incomplete contracts in
the economics literature, the application of incomplete contracts to collaborative R&D, and
ﬁnally, the empirical analysis of R&D contracts found in the management literature.
We refer to Tirole (1999) for an overview of the state of incomplete contracting research,
i.e., contracts cannot contain provisions for all possible future scenarios. He contrasts incom-
plete and complete contracting, and cautions the researcher about the inherent assumptions
of incomplete contracting. Our work is related to a stream of literature devoted to the holdup
problem. One approach considers the buyer's and seller's eﬃcient investment and delivery
of a good or service. In their model, Hart and Moore (1988) show that, if the court cannot
observe why delivery did not take place, the ﬁrst-best investment levels cannot be achieved
except under some restrictive assumptions. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995), however, show that
if the buyer and the seller can sign an option contract giving the buyer the right, but not
the obligation to deliver the goods, the ﬁrst-best investment levels can be achieved. Subse-
quent articles have shown that the ability of a contract to deliver ﬁrst-best eﬃciency may
depend, among other things, on the court mechanism used to enforce the contract (Edlin and
Reichelstein 1996), the nature of the buyer's and the seller's investment (Che and Hausch
1999), risk-aversion (Chung 1991; Holden 1999) and the timing of the investments (Smirnov
and Wait 2004).
Grossman and Hart (1986) introduce the notion of control rights as part of a contract,
separately from ownership or allocation of returns. When uncontractible elements lead to
distortions, an adequate allocation of control rights can reduce the ineﬃciencies. In Aghion
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and Bolton (1992), ﬁrst-best eﬃciency can be achieved through the appropriate allocation
of control rights, under certain conditions. Hellmann (1998) studies a venture capital model
which shows that an entrepreneur may be willing to concede favorable control terms to the
venture capitalist in order to increase his ﬁnancial reward. We ﬁnd similar results in a
diﬀerent setting.
The holdup problem has also been investigated in the area of contracting for collabora-
tive investment or research. In a seminal paper on the subject, Aghion and Tirole (1994),
posit that careful allocation of ownership and control rights is required in order to create
the correct incentives for the researcher. Taking this problem forward, many papers have
studied diﬀerent issues arising in R&D collaboration by changing the contracting terms or
the information structure of the game. Dechenaux et al. (2009) contrast the impact of mile-
stones and royalties on research eﬀort, risk sharing and shelving of projects. Bhaskaran and
Krishnan (2009) emphasize the collaborative aspect of new product development (NPD) and
propose diﬀerent mechanisms to share costs or development eﬀort, beyond the incentive ef-
fects of milestone and royalty contracts. They ﬁnd that either cost, eﬀort or no sharing at
all can be optimal under diﬀerent circumstances. Savva and Scholtes (2013) show that re-
search partnerships governed by milestone and royalty contracts lead to ineﬃcient outcomes
and describe a contract with opt-out options for either party which restores eﬃciency. Bhat-
tacharya et al. (2014) similarly ﬁnd that option contracts can create the correct incentives for
partners and achieve risk-sharing. Finally, Xiao and Xu (2012) study the traditional contract
structure, but allow for renegotiation of the contract terms. This improves incentives across
NPD stages but also increases the cost to the licensee of inducing the innovator to reveal
her true value. The main diﬀerence with the models studied above is that our setting com-
bines collaborative eﬀorts by both parties under technical uncertainty and market-potential
variability with a novel model of R&D eﬀort impact.
There is a sizable stream of empirical literature studying R&D licensing contracts con-
ﬁrming that the allocation of control rights is of crucial importance in practice and that
the assignment of control rights is closely linked to the ﬁnancial resources of the R&D ﬁrm
(Lerner and Merges 1998) and the relative ﬁnancial and product market strengths of the al-
liance partners (Elfenbein and Lerner 2003). In their conclusion, Lerner and Merges (1998)
mention that the relationship between the structure of compensation and the allocation of
control rights remains to be addressed. Lerner and Malmendier (2010) conﬁrm empirically
that when research eﬀort is non-contractible, termination options with (partial) allocation
of property rights to the ﬁnancing entity encourages the innovator to invest adequately in
research.
Interest in the timing decision for collaboration on R&D has been rising both in practice
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and in the academic world. In their analysis of the current state of the pharmaceutical
industry Kalamas and Pinkus (2003) suggest that the industry would beneﬁt from start-
ing collaborations earlier than it currently does and that better ﬁnancial terms for small
biotechnology ﬁrms at earlier stages would motivate biotechnology ﬁrms to partner earlier.
This would also allow the pharmaceutical partner to avoid more intense competition for late
stage licensing opportunities. The literature focuses on ﬁrm level and industry level charac-
teristics such as the background of the CEO, prior collaboration experience of the innovator,
R&D intensity of the innovator, introduction of new regulation and patent application and
approval as determinants of the timing of the collaboration (Katila and Mang 2003, Gans
et al. 2008). In contrast to these studies, our model identiﬁes project level characteristics
that have an impact on the timing of an agreement between partners. Thus our paper points
to new drivers of licensing contract timing, structure and payment terms, such as the impact
of R&D process type and market-potential variability, that would be interesting to consider
in future empirical work.
3 R&D Collaboration Model
In this section we deﬁne the model characteristics and formulate and solve the ﬁrst-best
project execution (i.e., one from a central planner's perspective).
3.1 Model Description
Our model consists of an innovator and a marketer. The innovator owns the intellectual
property rights to an innovation and desires to contract with a marketer to bring her in-
novation to market. The innovator can continue to perform R&D activities to improve the
characteristics of the innovation. The result of this R&D process is represented in stylized
form as three possible outcomes. First, if the technical features do not exceed a minimum
threshold, the product cannot be launched. Second, the product could have low market-
potential. Third, the product could have high market-potential. Thus, our model allows us
to go beyond a binary outcome of failure or success. Diﬀerent market-potential values could
result from the speciﬁc combination of technical features that may aﬀect the product's sales
prospects, for instance the eﬃcacy and side eﬀects of a new drug, or the weight, dimension
and battery life for electronics. We express market-potential as a scalar measure that sum-
marizes the base sales prospects of the product. Product sales, however, not only depend on
the market-potential, but also on how successfully the product is marketed. The innovator
has the necessary know-how to complete R&D, but she may lack the experience and the
resources for a successful product launch. The marketer, on the other hand, has expertise
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in new product management and desires to contract with the innovator to add innovative
products to his product portfolio.
R&D collaboration contracts can contain the following commonly found payment terms:
a contract signature fee, a milestone payment at successful completion of the research phase,
and a royalty percentage on the sales. Most R&D collaboration contracts will also specify
non-monetary clauses that determine the rights and obligations of both parties within the
relationship. We focus on the right (a) of both parties to choose whether to launch the
product, (b) for the marketer to buy out the innovator from the contract and (c) for the
innovator to buy back the product.
Figure 1: Project and Contract Timeline
The timeline of the project and the interaction between the innovator and the marketer
is given in Figure 1. We have created a separate timeline for diﬀerent timing scenarios:
upfront contracting, upfront contracting with renegotiation, and delayed contracting. At
time t = 1, the innovator negotiates and signs a contract with the marketer or decides
to delay contracting until t = 4. The contract speciﬁes the payments from the marketer
to the innovator (upfront payment s, milestone payment l, and royalty rate r) and can
also include clauses allocating control rights pertaining to product launch, or buy-out and
buy-back options. The innovator decides on her optimal R&D eﬀort level, e, and incurs
a corresponding cost, ce2/2, at t = 2. This inﬂuences the R&D outcome of the product,
which is observed at t = 3. The outcome can be failure (insuﬃcient for launch), low or high
market-potential (α0, αL and αH respectively). The R&D eﬀort inﬂuences the likelihood of
the three outcomes (pii(e) = pi + γie, i ∈ {0, L,H}) and has a positive eﬀect on expected
market-potential. At t = 4, one of three events can take place. If an upfront contract
was signed, either a launch decision has to be taken or the contract can be renegotiated.
If the decision was to delay at time t = 1, contract negotiation takes place for technically
successful products. After the product is launched, the marketer, or possibly the innovator
if the marketer chooses not to launch when the market-potential outcome is low, decides on
the appropriate marketing eﬀort at t = 5 (µiM for the marketer or µLI for the innovator)
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and incurs the cost of eﬀort (kjµ
2
ij/2, j ∈ {M, I}). Sales revenues at t = 6 are a function
of market-potential and marketing eﬀort (v(αi, µij) = αiµij). We assume that the innovator
and marketer are rational, risk-neutral agents who choose their eﬀort levels to maximize
respective individual proﬁt.
Central to the contracting problem is the assumption that the innovator's and marketer's
eﬀort levels are unobservable, and thus cannot be meaningfully written into a contract.
While it would be possible to specify the amount of resources to be invested, we argue that
it is unrealistic to deﬁne R&D or marketing input in terms of resources spent, because the
quality of the eﬀort inﬂuences the impact of invested resources. Because the eﬀort level of
the innovator and marketer are both unobservable, we deal with a two-sided moral hazard
problem and the contract will have to oﬀer incentives to both parties to invest an appropriate
level of eﬀort.
We summarize our notation in Table 2 and provide an explanation below. To guarantee
Decisions Parameters
e Innovator's R&D eﬀort αi Product's market-potential
µLI Innovator's marketing eﬀort in γi Impact of R&D eﬀort on probability of αi
product of market-potential L pi Probability of R&D outcome without eﬀort
s Upfront payment at signing pii(e) Probability of R&D outcome with eﬀort e
l Milestone payment at launch v(αi, µij) Sales value function
r Royalty rate on sales c Innovator's R&D eﬀort cost factor
µiM Marketer's marketing eﬀort in kI Innovator's marketing eﬀort cost factor
product of market-potential i kM Marketer's marketing eﬀort cost factor
* i ∈ {0, H, L} indicates R&D outcomes (market-potential) and j ∈ {I,M} indicates player
Table 2: Notation used in models
concavity of the objective function, we made the following assumptions: the probabilities of
the three scenarios of market-potential are linear in R&D eﬀort, sales revenue is linear in
marketing eﬀort, and the cost of research and marketing is quadratic in eﬀort. We assume
that blockbuster products can only be successfully marketed by the marketer, with a cost
factor kM , whereas the innovator can potentially market a low market-potential product
herself, with a cost factor kI , and kI > kM . To reduce notation, we set c = 1, pH = 0 and
write pi0(e) = 1−piL(e)−piH(e), with γH = 1 (wlog). This allows us to drop the subscript for γ
in the probability functions and write piL = pL+γe and piH = e. We allow γ ∈ [γ, γ] ∈ [−1, 1].
The limits γ and γ are chosen to ensure that pii remains a valid probability distribution (the
limits will be explicitly calculated after the model exposition).3
3Schuett (2012) also adopts a model where eﬀort inﬂuences types of outcomes for a ﬁrm licensing out a
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Another important factor to consider is the nature of the R&D process under consider-
ation: diﬀerent projects are aﬀected diﬀerently by the R&D eﬀort expended on them. In
particular, for a novel R&D process, research eﬀort increases the probability of being success-
ful (reduces pi0), more than it distinguishes between high and low market-potential outcomes.
This implies a γ close to 1. In the pharmaceutical industry, this could correspond to a project
aimed at the discovery of an entirely new mechanism of action against a particular disease.
Eﬀorts of the company in trying to develop this new mechanism of action may reduce the
chance of failure but increase the probability of both high and low market-potential outcomes
to a similar degree. At the other extreme, we have research that is incremental in nature
and alters features of an existing product or applies a known technology to a new market. In
that case, the R&D eﬀort does not so much increase the probability of success as aﬀect the
relative probabilities of market-potential outcomes (increases piH mostly at the expense of
piL). This corresponds to γ close to -1. We can illustrate this category with the development
of a ﬁxed-dose or single-tablet regimen of an existing drug with a proven mechanism of ac-
tion where higher R&D eﬀort would improve compliance and hence adoption, while technical
success is relatively assured regardless of the R&D eﬀort. By varying the parameter γ from
−1 to 1, we allow for intermediate scenarios of R&D eﬀort impact.
Another important assumption is that the achieved market-potential (upon observation
of technical success) is non-veriﬁable, i.e., cannot be be contracted upon.4 This implies
that (a) the milestone payment cannot vary depending on the market-potential and (b) the
milestone payment is conditioned on the launch. Similar assumptions for the deﬁnition of a
milestone payment are made in Savva and Scholtes (2013) and Bhattacharya et al. (2014).
This is in line with management practice, where future market-potential is very hard to
contract upon.
3.2 Social Optimum
We determine the socially optimal execution (ﬁrst-best execution) of the collaboration, which
will serve as a benchmark for the performance of a contractual relationship. In this case,
the decision rights are given to a central planner who determines the research and marketing
patent for two ﬁelds of use. In the absence of overlap between ﬁelds of use, licensees act as monopolies. With
overlap, licensees compete, which reduces value. Higher eﬀort reduces the chance of overlap. In contrast, our
model considers highlow outcomes along with a failure outcome and distinguishes between diﬀerent types
of R&D processes.
4While contracts often have ﬁnancial terms that vary with the level of sales achieved, such as sales
milestones, royalties or tiered royalties, these payments depend on the actual sales realized, not the underlying
market-potential. In other words, whether a given sales level has been reached with lower market-potential
and high eﬀort or higher market-potential but lower eﬀort cannot be veriﬁed. Therefore, one cannot contract
upon market-potential directly.
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eﬀorts. The following formulation optimizes the expected total project value V SOC :
max
e≥0,µiM≥0
V = e(αHµHM − kMµ
2
HM
2
) + (pL + γe)(αLµLM − kMµ
2
LM
2
)− e
2
2
(1)
resulting in: µSOCiM =
αi
kM
, (2)
eSOC =
γα2L + α
2
H
2kM
, (3)
V SOC =
pLα
2
L
2kM
+
(γα2L + α
2
H)
2
8k2M
. (4)
The central planner always assigns the task of marketing the product to the marketer
as he has a lower marketing eﬀort cost. The marketing eﬀort decision can be separated
from the R&D eﬀort decision as the optimal marketing eﬀort depends only on the product's
realized market-potential and not on the R&D eﬀort preceding it. The optimal R&D eﬀort,
eSOC , depends on the marketing eﬀort, as the latter determines the sales revenue under each
outcome.5 Self-interested innovators and marketers, however, deviate from socially optimal
eﬀort levels and the contract must align incentives to achieve maximum value.
We develop a series of models with diﬀerent contract structures, terms and timings in
the remainder of the paper (please refer to Figure 1 for an overview of the diﬀerent models
covered). In these models, we take the perspective of the innovator who owns the invention.
We therefore use the terms optimum/optimal to refer to the innovator's payoﬀ and the terms
social optimum/socially optimal as they were used in this subsection.
4 Upfront Contracting
Innovators often contract with the marketer before the R&D eﬀort has been fully completed.
In that case, a signiﬁcant portion of the technical and commercial risk is still remaining. The
contract structure should therefore include clauses that allow the partnership to react to the
resolution of the uncertainties, such as through the allocation of launch control or options.
For analytical tractability we start out by limiting our contracts to two payment terms.
The milestone contract contains an upfront payment and a milestone payment at product
launch. The royalty contract contains an upfront payment and a percentage royalty on prod-
uct sales. These simple contracts allow us to focus on the underlying interactions between
payment terms and structural elements. Milestone payments aﬀect the desirability of launch
from the marketer's perspective which makes launch control an eﬀective value creation mech-
anism. Conversely, royalties create an eﬃciency loss by distorting the marketer's eﬀort and
5The deﬁnition of eSOC allows us to determine γ = min{γ∗, 1}, with γ∗ such that (1 + γ)eSOC = 1− pL.
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options can be used to address this problem. We ﬁrst analyze control rights paired with
milestone contracts, then turn to options paired with royalty contracts. We also conﬁrm
numerically that our results hold for contracts that include all three payment terms.
4.1 Launch Control
First, we focus on the allocation of the right to decide whether or not to launch the product
to either the innovator or the marketer. Intuitively, we can immediately discern that the
innovator's and the marketer's decisions will not always be aligned: the innovator is always
eager to launch, as she no longer bears any costs once her part of the development phase is
completed, whereas the marketer will only want to launch if the product will be suﬃciently
proﬁtable to cover the contractual payments to the innovator.
Launch control is particularly relevant in milestone payment contracts, in which the
marketer agrees to pay the innovator an upfront payment s and a milestone payment l.
Milestone contracts oﬀer the advantage of not distorting the eﬀort level of the marketer: a
milestone payment is constant regardless of the marketer's eﬀort whereas under a royalty
rate, an increase in the marketer's eﬀort increases the royalty payments he has to make. A
high milestone payment, however, may turn a marginally proﬁtable invention into a loss to
the marketer, and the marketer and the innovator may disagree on launching the invention.6
Thus we focus on milestone payment contracts with ﬁrst the innovator and then the marketer
holding the launch control rights.
4.1.1 Innovator Launch Control
As mentioned earlier, the innovator always beneﬁts from launch as she earns a milestone
payment l and bears no further cost. The innovator's optimization problem, taking into
account the marketer's incentive and participation constraints, is given by:
max
s≥0,l≥0
eˆl + (pL + γeˆ)l − eˆ
2
2
+ s (5)
s.t. µˆiM =µiM≥0 {αiµiM −
kMµ
2
iM
2
− l}, i = {H,L} (6)
eˆ = (γ + 1)l (7)
eˆ(αH µˆHM − kM µˆ
2
HM
2
− l) + (pL + γeˆ)(αLµˆLM − kM µˆ
2
LM
2
− l)− s ≥ 0 (8)
6This will not happen with a royalty-only contract, as the payment to the innovator is proportional to the
revenue made by the marketer, and in a low realization, the lower royalty payment to the innovator guarantees
that the product remains proﬁtable to the marketer who will want to launch the product regardless of the
technical outcome.
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Eq (6) reﬂects the marketer's optimization problem for the marketing eﬀort. Eq (7)
determines the innovator's optimal R&D eﬀort. Finally, Eq (8) ensures that the marketer
obtains his reservation utility, which is set to zero.
Theorem 1 A milestone contract with innovator launch control achieves the social opti-
mum if and only if pL = 0 and γ ≥ 0. In that case, the optimal contract is (s, l) =(
0,
α2H+α
2
Lγ
2(1+γ)kM
)
. If pL > 0, the social optimum is not achieved and the optimal contract is
(s, l) =
(
0,
(α2H+γα
2
L)(1+γ)−2kMpL+
√
((α2H+γα
2
L)(1+γ)−2kMpL)2+8kM (1+γ)2α2LpL
4kM (1+γ)2
)
.
All proofs are in the Appendix. This theorem tells us that us that milestone payments
may not be eﬀective for every R&D process type. When γ = −1, a milestone contract fails
to induce any R&D eﬀort at all; because the milestone payment does not depend on the
achieved market-potential and eﬀort does not increase the chances of technical success, the
innovator has no incentive to expend any eﬀort. As γ varies from −1 to 1, ceteris paribus, the
innovator's value from milestone contracts will increase, as milestone payments will become
increasingly eﬀective at creating an incentive for the innovator, and might even be able to
achieve social optimum under the condition listed in Theorem 1.
4.1.2 Marketer Launch Control
Allocating launch control to the marketer creates a new constraint for the innovator: once
the market-potential is revealed, the marketer will only want to launch if his proﬁt, net of
the milestone payment to the innovator, is positive. Therefore, if the innovator designs the
contract to induce the marketer to launch the product in both market-potential outcomes
(δ = 1), the milestone payment is bounded by the proﬁt under the low market-potential
outcome, and the innovator's incentive to invest in research will be correspondingly low. If
the milestone payment exceeds the net proﬁt under the low market-potential outcome, the
marketer will prefer not to launch the low market-potential product (δ = 0) and only launch
the high market-potential product. We call such a contract an exclusion contract. If the
marketer refuses to launch the product, the innovator regains all rights to the innovation
and can launch the product on her own. We modify the innovator's optimization problem
accordingly.
max
s≥0,l≥0
eˆl + δˆ(pL + γeˆ)l + (1− δˆ)(pL + γeˆ)(αLµˆLI − kI µˆ
2
LI
2
)− eˆ
2
2
+ s (9)
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s.t. µˆiM =µiM≥0 {αiµiM −
kMµ
2
iM
2
− l}, i = {H,L} (10)
δˆ =δ={0,1} {δ(αLµˆLM − kM µˆ
2
LM
2
− l)} (11)
µˆLI =µLI≥0 {αLµLI −
kIµ
2
LI
2
} (12)
eˆ = (δˆγ + 1)l + (1− δˆ)γ α
2
L
2kI
(13)
eˆ(αH µˆHM − kM µˆ
2
HM
2
− l) + δˆ(pL + γeˆ)(αLµˆLM − kM µˆ
2
LM
2
− l)− s ≥ 0 (14)
Theorem 2 There exists a γˆ ∈ [−1, 1] such that for all γ ≥ γˆ the optimal contract is
(s, l) = (
(α2H−α2L)α2L(1+γ)
4ck2M
,
α2L
2kM
) with the project being launched by the marketer under both
market-potential outcomes, whereas for all γ < γˆ, an exclusion contract (s, l) = (0,
α2H
2kM
) is
optimal.
Theorem 2 shows that it may not always be optimal for the innovator to aim for both
market-potential outcomes to be launched by the marketer, despite the marketer having
a lower cost of marketing eﬀort. To guarantee the marketer's launch of the low market-
potential product, the milestone payment is restricted by his proﬁt in that scenario. As the
milestone payment l is constant and does not reﬂect the higher value obtained in case of a
high market-potential outcome, the innovator has a relatively low incentive to invest in R&D
to achieve a high market-potential outcome. This constraint on l is particularly restrictive
if the market-potential variability is large. The problem is compounded for low γ as the
R&D eﬀort increases the probability of a high market-potential outcome at the expense of
the low market-potential outcome, and the ideal R&D eﬀort can only be induced by giving
strong incentives linked to the high market-potential outcome. In such cases, it might be
more proﬁtable for the innovator to create a strong incentive to invest in research by setting
the milestone payment such that the marketer will only launch the high market-potential
outcome.7
Intuitively, we expect that giving away control to the marketer should not be in the inno-
vator's interest as it adds a constraint to her decision problem. Furthermore, as the marketer
enjoys a cost advantage in marketing eﬀort, an exclusion contract that forces the innovator
to launch the low market-potential outcome herself is ineﬃcient, and innovator launch con-
trol would seem more appropriate. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that it can be in the innovator's
interest to yield control over the launch decision to the marketer when an exclusion contract
is optimal. We formally characterize the optimal contract in the following theorem.
7The case of the exclusion contract, by achieving a high R&D eﬀort when γ < 0, allows us to determine
γ = max{−1, γ∗}, with γ∗ such that −γ(α2H/(2kM ) + γα2L/(2kI)) = pL.
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Theorem 3 If γˆ > −1, then a γ˜ ≤ γˆ exists such that for all γ ≤ γ˜ an exclusion contract
is more proﬁtable than the optimal value from a milestone contract with innovator launch
control.
Ceding control is unattractive for γ ≥ γˆ, when the optimal contract under marketer
launch control is to launch both outcomes: the launch decision remains the same, but a
constraint on the milestone payment is added. However, if a region exists in which the
exclusion contract is optimal, i.e., γˆ > −1, there will be a region such that ceding launch
control is optimal for −1 ≤ γ ≤ γ˜ ≤ γˆ.
The implications of Theorem 3 may be more apparent when we investigate Figure 2. In
general, which contract is preferred depends on trade-oﬀs made between various ineﬃciencies
caused by each contract. First, note that exclusion contracts create a launch ineﬃciency for
low market-potential products because the product is launched by the innovator who is at
a cost disadvantage when it comes to exerting marketing eﬀort. This launch ineﬃciency
is more pronounced when αL is high, i.e. variability is low. When this is the case, it is
favorable to have innovator launch control which avoids the launch ineﬃciency and ensures
that the product is always launched by the marketer who has a cost advantage. Second,
the fact that the marketer only launches the high market-potential product means that the
innovator can charge a very high milestone payment when signing an exclusion contract.
This high milestone payment, in turn, creates incentives for the innovator to increase the
probability of the high market-potential outcome by increasing her R&D eﬀort. When γ is
low, increased R&D eﬀort also translates into a lower chance of suﬀering from the launch
ineﬃciency, further increasing the attractiveness of the exclusion contract. Combining these
two eﬀects, we can see that lower γ and higher variability make exclusion contracts attractive
while higher γ and lower variability make innovator launch control more attractive. In
summary, while an exclusion contract may substantially reduce the proﬁt under the low
market-potential outcome, it allows a high milestone payment which creates an incentive
for higher R&D eﬀort. As the innovator cannot credibly commit to not launching once the
market-potential has been revealed to be low, she creates commitment by ceding launch
control to the marketer.
4.2 Options
Another way to govern the launch of a product is to grant buy-out or buy-back options.
Under royalty contracts, options rather than control rights become valuable tools because
the launch decision will be unanimous. Royalty contracts oﬀer two advantages: they oﬀer the
innovator an incentive that is directly proportional to the value created by the R&D eﬀort and
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Figure 2: Optimal milestone contracts: innovator vs marketer launch control
(αH = 1, kM = 1.5, kI = 4, pL = 0.25)
they do not distort the launch decision. In our model without ﬁxed costs related to product
launch, there is no distortion of the launch decision and the low and high market-potential
outcomes are both proﬁtable to the marketer. Therefore, we do not diﬀerentiate between
innovator and marketer launch control. However, royalties present the major drawback
of distorting marketer eﬀort, destroying a fraction of the project's realized value. This
also means that royalties are most damaging for high market-potential realizations. This
quandary makes buy-out options attractive.8
A buy-out option can be beneﬁcial if the innovator can set a high strike price that the
marketer wishes to exercise in the high market-potential outcome, without preventing him
from launching the product under the low market-potential outcome. We ﬁnd that buy-
back options on their own are never optimal as an exclusion contract can be used to ensure
innovator launch of the low market-potential outcome. Finally, it is possible to combine buy-
out and buy-back options in one contract. This contract, however, will simplify to either the
buy-out or the exclusion contract, depending on which contract structure is optimal.
4.2.1 Buy-Out Option
A contract can oﬀer a buy-out option to the marketer by specifying the strike price of the
option that he has to pay to the innovator, and the time at which it can be exercised. In our
timeline, the option expiry is logically set after the R&D outcome is revealed but before the
launch decision is taken. As a benchmark, we will ﬁrst determine the optimal royalty rate
without a buy-out option, and then discuss the impact of a buy-out option.
Optimal royalty rate without buy-out option A simple royalty contract without a
8Buy-out option would be redundant in combination with a milestone contract in which the buy-out price
would be equal to the milestone payment.
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buy-out option leads to the following optimization problem.
max
s≥0,0≤r≤1
eˆrαH µˆHM + (pL + γeˆ)rαLµˆLM − eˆ
2
2
+ s (15)
s.t. µˆiM =µiM≥0 {(1− r)αiµiM −
kMµ
2
iM
2
}, i = {H,L} (16)
eˆ = (γαLµˆLM + αH µˆHM)r (17)
eˆ((1− r)αH µˆHM − kM µˆ
2
HM
2
) + (pL + γeˆ)((1− r)αLµˆLM − kM µˆ
2
LM
2
)− s ≥ 0
(18)
Proposition 1 If pL = 0, then the optimal royalty rate is a constant r
∗ = 1/3. If pL > 0,
then the optimal royalty rate drops below 1/3.
The optimal royalty rate balances the detrimental eﬀect on value due to the reduced
marketing eﬀort with the increase in probability of launch achieved by giving an incentive
to the innovator to invest in R&D eﬀort. A higher pL decreases the optimal royalty rate
because the need for R&D eﬀort is less and the detrimental impact on value after launch
gains in importance.
Buy-out option and royalty rate The buy-out clause speciﬁes a price B at which
the marketer can buy out the innovator after the R&D outcome has been revealed. If the
marketer exercises the buy-out clause, he no longer pays the royalty on the product sales,
and he will invest the socially optimal amount of marketing eﬀort because he becomes the
sole owner of the product. Clearly, this is most valuable if the option is exercised for the
high market-potential outcome, as the losses from the distortion due to the royalty rate are
largest. The contract should be structured such that it creates discrimination between the
low and high market-potential outcomes without requiring external enforcement. This is
achieved by setting the buy-out price B such that:{
α2H
2kM
−B ≥ (1−r)2α2H
2kM
⇐⇒ B ≤ r(2−r)α2H
2kM
α2L
2kM
−B ≤ (1−r)2α2L
2kM
⇐⇒ B ≥ r(2−r)α2L
2kM
The innovator prefers the highest possible exercise price and sets B = r(2− r)α2H/(2kM),
and the marketer will not exercise the buy-out option under the low market-potential out-
come. Thus we formulate the innovator's optimization problem as follows:9
max
s≥0,0≤r≤1
eˆ
r(2− r)α2H
2kM
+ (pL + γeˆ)rαLµˆLM − eˆ
2
2
+ s (19)
9The deﬁnition of µˆHM andB = r(2−r)α2H/(2kM ) implies that (1−r)αH µˆHM−kM µˆ2HM/2 = α2H/(2kM )−
B.
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s.t. µˆiM =µiM≥0 {(1− r)αiµiM −
kMµ
2
iM
2
}, i = {H,L} (20)
eˆ = (γαLµˆLM +
(2− r)α2H
2kM
)r (21)
eˆ((1− r)αH µˆHM − kM µˆ
2
HM
2
) + (pL + γeˆ)((1− r)αLµˆLM − kM µˆ
2
LM
2
)− s ≥ 0
(22)
Theorem 4 A royalty contract with buy-out option yields a higher expected value to the
innovator than a royalty contract without buy-out option. Furthermore, the royalty rate of a
buy-out contract exceeds the royalty rate of a royalty contract.
This theorem shows that buy-out options are relevant in the presence of royalties as they
allow the innovator to increase the royalty rate  with positive eﬀects on R&D eﬀort 
yet limits the adverse eﬀect of royalties to the low market-potential outcome. While it is
generally accepted that holding an option usually creates value, the theorem demonstrates
that giving away an option is also valuable when it creates a credible commitment to higher
R&D eﬀort.
Our prior analysis revealed that it could be optimal to assign launch control rights to the
marketer in order to credibly signal high R&D eﬀort. This came at the cost of the innovator
having to launch the low market-potential products, despite her cost disadvantage. A buy-
out contract oﬀers a solution to the launch ineﬃciency: the increased royalty rate does
not prevent launch of the low market-potential outcome but acts as a motivation for the
marketer to exercise the buy-out option under the high market-potential outcome. Thus the
incentive to invest in research is still strong as the innovator hopes to achieve the higher
prize of the buy-out option, without forcing launch ineﬃciency. Whether this creates a gain
over the exclusion contract depends on the comparison of two ineﬃciencies: namely, the
higher marketing cost of the innovator versus the negative impact of the royalty rate on
the marketer's eﬀort. As the comparison between milestone contracts with innovator launch
control and royalty contracts with buy-out options is inconclusive, we resort to numerical
methods to determine which type of contract is optimal for diﬀerent problem paremeters.
4.2.2 Buy-Back Option
In a setting where the innovator has the option to buy back her product with no option
assigned to the marketer, we ﬁnd that exclusion contracts render contracts with buy-back
options suboptimal. By setting a high enough milestone, the exclusion contract allows the
innovator to take back its product for free while also avoiding sales-distorting royalties. The
result regarding two-way options below will make this outcome more apparent.
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4.2.3 Two-Way Option
Buy-out and buy-back options can be included in a single contract where the two parties
potentially exercise diﬀerent options in diﬀerent scenarios. However, we ﬁnd that such a
contract is equivalent to either a buy-out option or an exclusion contract.
Theorem 5 In a two-way option contract, the innovator either sets an arbitrarily high buy-
back price making it suboptimal to ever exercise the buy-back option, or sets r = 1, the
buy-back strike price to zero and the buy-out strike price to α2H/(2kM).
In the ﬁrst case of Theorem 5, the innovator never exercises the buy-back option which
makes the two-way option equivalent to a buy-out option. In the latter case, a two-way
option contract allows an option to be exercised in both market-potential outcomes. This, in
turn, allows the innovator to set royalties to r = 1 without harming marketing eﬀorts because
royalties will always be avoided due to the exercised options. As royalties are set to 1, the
product is worthless in the hands of the marketer, and he is willing to allow the innovator
to buy" the product back for free. With r = 1, the buy-out strike price r(2− r)α2H/(2kM)
becomes α2H/(2kM), which makes the contract equivalent to an exclusion contract.
Figure 3 compares the values of three diﬀerent contracts. The optimal contract choice
depends on the tradeoﬀs between the launch, marketing and research ineﬃciencies created by
each contract structure. For novel projects (high γ) and/or low market-potential variability
(high αL), launch and marketing ineﬃciencies are costly and a milestone contract with inno-
vator launch control is preferable. For incremental products (low γ), research ineﬃciencies
can only be resolved with exclusion contracts or buy-out contracts. If launch ineﬃciencies are
of concern (high αL), this is best addressed through buy-out contracts. Otherwise, exclusion
contracts are preferred as they generate the strongest research incentive.
4.3 Full Contracts: Upfront and Milestone Payments and Royalties
Our analysis so far has focused on contracts with either milestone payments or royalties. Nat-
urally, designing contracts with both elements may lead to higher contract values. However,
this is not always the case as shown by Proposition 2.
Proposition 2
1. Milestone contracts without a royalty rate are optimal (a) if the milestone contract
with innovator launch control achieves social optimum or (b) if an exclusion contract
is optimal.
2. It is optimal to set l = 0 when γ = −1.
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Figure 3: Optimal contract structure: Launch control and buy-out option
(αH = 1, kM = 1.5, kI = 4, pL = 0.25)
In cases not covered by Proposition 2 it may be beneﬁcial to include all payment terms in
the contract. We resort to numerical analyses for a comparison of the diﬀerent contracting
choices.
Figure 4: Optimal contract structure with full contracts
(αH = 1, kM = 1.5, kI = 4, pL = 0.25)
It is clear from Figure 4 that the results for full contracts display a very similar pattern
of contract structure choices as the milestone-only or royalty-only contracts. The actual
values taken on by the payment terms, however, are inﬂuenced both by the optimal contract
structure and the choice to allow full contracts. Our results conﬁrm the intuition that
the optimal royalty rate is much higher when a buy-out contract is optimal than for other
contract structures.
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5 Renegotiation
The allocation and exercise of control rights and options is not the only way to react to new
information: as uncertainties are resolved over time, the two parties may choose to renego-
tiate the initial contract. While Plambeck and Taylor (2007) suggest that renegotiation is
often excluded by papers in operations management on the grounds that it is prohibitively
costly, the authors show that renegotiation can be optimal. So far in our paper, we have
implicitly assumed that renegotiation is prohibitively costly. In this section, we explore the
cases when renegotiation is costless or moderately costly. We focus most of our eﬀorts on
the less explored intermediate cost case where renegotiation is neither prohibitively costly
nor costless.
If renegotiation is costless, Hart and Moore (1988) and Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995)
show that renegotiation can be beneﬁcial and even help achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome under
certain conditions. In our model, renegotiation could be instigated once new information
becomes available, i.e., the R&D outcome is revealed, but before the contract terms are
executed and the marketer's eﬀort level is decided. Renegotiation occurs whenever there are
eﬃciency gains to be realized because the initial contract distorts eﬀort or distorts launch
decisions and a new contract can be written that leaves both parties better oﬀ. In line
with Hart and Moore (1988), the innovator will invest the optimal R&D eﬀort level if she
is the recipient of all the ex-post surplus. This can be achieved by writing an exclusion
contract with a milestone payment l = α2H/(2kM) that the innovator will subsequently oﬀer
to negotiate down to l = α2L/(2kM) whenever the market-potential is low. This gives the
innovator the full surplus regardless of the market-potential without distorting the marketer's
eﬀort level.
Adding renegotiation costs clearly reduces the attractiveness of renegotiation and if the
cost of renegotiation exceeds the beneﬁts achieved by renegotiation, no Pareto-improving
renegotiation can take place. Various papers acknowledge that renegotiation is neither cost-
less nor prohibitively costly (e.g. Garleanu and Zwiebel 2009). We model the cost of rene-
gotiation as a ﬁxed cost, F > 0, that is entirely borne by the principal, the innovator, at the
time of renegotiation and study the previously discussed contract types in turn.
Milestone Contracts As milestone contracts do not lead to distortion of marketing
eﬀort, the only beneﬁt from renegotiation is when the launch decision is distorted and we can
focus exclusively on exclusion contracts. The innovator may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to renegotiate
an exclusion contract in case of a low market-potential outcome. Inserting the value of
the future renegotiation into the innovator's initial problem formulation, this leads to the
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following optimization problem:
max
s,l
el + (pL + γe)(
α2L
2kM
− F )− e
2
2
+ s
Proposition 3 If F ≤ α2L
2
( 1
kM
− 1
kI
), the exclusion contract will be renegotiated in the low
market-potential outcome. The optimal contract terms are {s, l} = {0, α2H
2kM
}, and lead to the
following optimal R&D eﬀort and contract value:
e∗ =
α2H + γα
2
L
2kM
− γF, V ∗ = (α
2
H + α
2
Lγ)
2
2k2M
+
(2(α2LpL − Fγ(α2H + α2Lγ))
kM
− F (2pL − γ2F )
Buy-Out Option Contract In an option contract, eﬃciency gains can be achieved
by eliminating the eﬀort-distorting royalty rate in the low market-potential outcome. The
innovator's optimization problem becomes:
max
s,r
e
r(2− r)α2H
2kM
+ (pL + γe)(
r(2− r)α2L
2kM
− F )− e
2
2
+ s
Renegotiation is only ex-post rational when the renegotiation cost is F ≤ α2Lr2
2kM
. As
we cannot write a closed form expression for the optimal royalty rate in the absence of
renegotiation, we focus instead on the intuition behind the optimal buy-out contract in the
presence of costly renegotiation. Assume that without renegotiation, the optimal royalty
rate is r1 (as calculated in section 4.2.1). Two cases may occur: F ≤ α
2
Lr
2
1
2kM
or F >
α2Lr
2
1
2kM
. In
the ﬁrst case, renegotiation is proﬁtable, whereas in the second it is not. Let us take the ﬁrst
case, in which renegotiation occurs. If the buy-out contract induces renegotiation, then the
minimum amount of distortion of the R&D eﬀort is trivially achieved when the royalty rate
is set to r = 1. In the high market-potential outcome, the marketer exercises his buy-out
option priced at B = α2H/(2kM), and in the low market-potential outcome, renegotiation
achieves a net payoﬀ to the innovator of α2L/(2kM) − F . Note that these are exactly the
same payoﬀs as in the milestone contract with marketer launch and renegotiation. In the
second case, renegotiation is not ex-post optimal, and the optimal royalty rate is r∗ = r1.
The contract value is the same as in the buy-out contract without renegotiation studied in
section 4.2.1. A comparison of the two contract values then allows us to determine whether
the buy-out contract should be structured so as to achieve renegotiation by setting r = 1 or
not by setting r = r1.
We present a comparison of all contracts covered and costly renegotiation in Figure 5.
Remember that our previous analysis shows that buy-out contracts with renegotiation are
equivalent to exclusion contracts with renegotiation. Renegotiation is only optimal when
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the various eﬃciency losses of the upfront contracts exceed the cost of renegotiation. As
marketing and research ineﬃciencies are highest for incremental products with low market-
potential variability, renegotiation is optimal in the top left quadrant of the ﬁgure. Whenever
renegotiation is too costly, the tradeoﬀs between other regions of the ﬁgure are the same as
in Figure 3.
Figure 5: Optimal Contracts with Costly Renegotiation
(αH = 1, kM = 1.5, kI = 4, pL = 0.25, F = 0.02)
6 Delayed Contracting
While there may be forces extraneous to our paper such as risk aversion or cash constraints
that push the innovator to contract early in the R&D cycle, in the absence of such motives
for upfront contracting, the innovator may choose to bide her time and delay contracting
with the marketer until his contribution is needed. At this time, the R&D eﬀort has been
made and its outcome realized. If contracting is costless and market-potential is observable,
the ﬁrst-best solution can be trivially obtained. The innovator simply sells the product to
the marketer at its market value, yielding the right incentives for both the innovator and the
marketer. We now relax these cost and observability conditions in turn.
6.1 Costly Contracting
While contracting is often assumed to be costless, we have argued before that this is unlikely
to be the case: legal fees or delays in development reduce the value of the R&D project,
thus aﬀecting the contract value that can be created. We introduce a ﬁxed cost for upfront
and delayed contracting, denoted by F1 and F2 respectively. To avoid the trivial scenario
in which contracting is never optimal, even after the R&D outcome is revealed, we limit
F2 < α
2
H/(2kM).
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Adding a ﬁxed cost to the innovator's optimization problem for upfront contracting does
not change her optimal contract choice. The cost F1 can be deducted from the optimal
contract value determined as per our prior analysis. The beneﬁts and drawbacks of the
diﬀerent contractual choices still apply. However, we also note that upfront contracting costs
are incurred regardless of whether the project turns out to be successful or not. When the
innovator delays contracting, she incurs a ﬁxed cost F2, and, given that market-potential is
observable, the project is sold for a ﬁxed price equivalent to its market value. The innovator's
optimization problem becomes:
max
e
e(
α2H
2kM
− F2) + (pL + γe) max
{
α2L
2kM
− F2, α
2
L
2kI
}
− e
2
2
From the point of view of eﬃciency, we observe two opposing forces. On the upside,
delayed contracting avoids royalties thereby ensuring optimal marketing eﬀort from the mar-
keter. On the downside, the innovator's R&D eﬀort is distorted due to the future contracting
cost F2 and an ineﬃcient launch decision may be taken if the cost of contracting is too high to
justify selling to the marketer in the low market-potential outcome (F2 > α
2
L/2(1/kM−1/kI))
and the innovator takes the project forward herself. The optimal R&D eﬀort and contract
value are summarized below.
Proposition 4 If the innovator chooses to delay contracting, the optimal R&D eﬀort and
contract value are given by the expressions below whenever F2 ≤ α2L/2(1/kM − 1/kI).
e∗ =
α2H + α
2
Lγ
2kM
− (1 + γ)F2, V ∗ = (α
2
H + α
2
Lγ)
2 − (α2H + α2L)F2(1 + γ) + α2LpL
2kM
+
F2(F2(1 + γ)
2 − 2pL)
2
If F2 > α
2
L/2(1/kM − 1/kI), the optimal R&D eﬀort and contract value are:
e∗ =
α2HkI + α
2
LγkM
2kIkM
− F2, V ∗ = (α
2
HkI + α
2
LγkM)
2
8k2Ik
2
M
− (α
2
HkI + α
2
LγkM)F2 + α
2
LγpLkM + kIkMF
2
2
2kIkM
The choice between upfront or delayed contracting needs to balance the beneﬁts and costs
of the diﬀerent timing options. We can see from Figure 6 that either delayed contracting
or one of the previously discussed milestone or option contracts may be optimal. Similar
to the discussion about renegotiation, delayed contracting is optimal whenever the research
and marketing ineﬃciencies of upfront contracting are high, i.e., in the top left quadrant.
Intuitively, the region where delayed contracting is optimal will expand or shrink depending
on the relative cost of upfront vs. delayed contracting.
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Figure 6: Optimal Contracts with Delayed Contracting
(αH = 1, kM = 1.5, kI = 4, pL = 0.25, F1 = 0.005, F2 = 0.02)
6.2 Unobservable market-potential
As previously discussed, delayed contracting can achieve ﬁrst-best if contracting is costless
and market-potential is observable. Having analyzed the impact of relaxing the ﬁrst of these
conditions, we now relax the observability assumption.
The innovator observes failure versus success at the end of the research phase but market-
potential is only observable to the marketer. This leads to a principal-agent problem at
t = 4 where the principal (innovator) knows the probabilities of the possible outcomes, while
the agent (marketer) knows the outcome. We adopt the terminology of adverse selection
problems and label the marketer facing a high (low) market-potential outcome as the H-type
(L-type). Our setup is a variation from the typical principal-agent model where probabilities
for types are exogenous; they are endogenous in our case. The innovator solves the following
optimization problem and selects contract parameters, as a function of her eﬀort. The
incentive compatibility constraints (ICH and ICL) ensure that each type of marketer prefers
the contract intended for his own type while the individual rationality constraints (IRH and
IRL) ensure that both types participate.
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max
0≤li,0≤ri≤1
Ω(e, lL, lH , rL, rH) = piL(e)
(
lL +
rL(1− rL)α2L
kM
)
+ piH(e)
(
lH +
rH(1− rH)α2H
kM
)
s.t.
(1− rH)2α2H
2kM
− lH ≥ (1− rL)
2α2H
2kM
− lL (ICH)
(1− rL)2α2L
2kM
− lL ≥ (1− rH)
2α2L
2kM
− lH (ICL)
(1− rH)2α2H
2kM
− lH ≥ 0 (IRH)
(1− rL)2α2L
2kM
− lL ≥ 0 (IRL)
Proposition 5 It is optimal for the innovator to oﬀer a menu of two contracts. One in-
tended for the H-type marketer with
l∗H =
(2r∗L − r∗2L )α2H + (1− r∗L)2α2L
2kM
, r∗H = 0
and another intended for the L-type marketer with
l∗L =
(1− r∗L)2α2L
2kM
, r∗L =
piH(e)(α
2
H − α2L)
piH(e)(α2H − α2L) + piL(e)α2L
.
The L-type marketer receives a contract with milestones and royalties that transfers all
value created from the partnership to the innovator. Intuitively, royalties cause a larger
distortion for the H-type marketer who enjoys a more valuable product. The innovator
designs a contract with higher milestones lH > lL for the H-type marketer and zero royalties.
While the lower milestone is attractive to the H-type marketer, the value destroyed by
royalties is much higher for the H-type marketer than the L-type, thereby discouraging him
from choosing the contract intended for the L-type. This allows for separation of the two
types. The H-type marketer enjoys an information advantage and makes a positive proﬁt.
Theorem 6 Under unobservable market-potential, an upfront full contract with a buy-out
option outperforms both delayed contracting and an upfront buy-out option without an upfront
payment.
While the information advantage of the marketer can be partially addressed by a menu
of contracts when delayed contracting leads to unobservable market-potential, the marketer
would still retain some information rents. Theorem 6 shows that a full contract, which uses
all three payment terms (s, l, r), signed upfront when neither party has superior information
allows the innovator not to give information rents. To see this, ﬁrst note that the menu
of contracts described in Proposition 5 can be replicated by a single buy-out contract with
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l = lL, r = rL and B = lH − lL = (2r−r
2)α2H
2kM
, the payment of which relieves the marketer
of the obligation to pay royalties. Second, the positive rents enjoyed by the H-type can
be extracted by an upfront signature fee s > 0, at time t=1, that does not interfere with
incentive compatibility or product launch decisions, at time t=4 where the signature fee is
a sunk cost for the marketer.
7 Robustness
Given the centrality of the parameter γ to our model, we test the robustness of our results
to an alternate model speciﬁcation in which the innovator can invest in two diﬀerent types
of research eﬀorts: research eﬀort eP enhances the probability of technical success whereas
research eﬀort eQ increases the probability of a high market-potential given technical success.
We list the necessary notation changes in Table 3. All variables not mentioned in the table are
as per the original model. Similar to our original model, we make the following assumptions:
the probabilities are linear in research eﬀort, pi(eP ) = p+ eP for the probability of technical
success and κ(eQ) = q + eQ for the probability of high market-potential given technical
success; and the cost of both research eﬀorts is quadratic in eﬀort, i.e. cP e
2
P/2 and cQe
2
Q/2,
respectively.
Decisions Parameters
eP Research eﬀort to increase p Base probability of technical success
probability of technical success cP Cost factor of research eﬀort eP
eQ Research eﬀort to increase q Base probability of high market-potential
probability of high market-potential cQ Cost factor of research eﬀort eQ
Table 3: Notation for Model with Two Research Eﬀorts
When marketing eﬀort is undertaken by the marketer, the project value is:
V = (p+eP )
(
(q + eQ)
(
αHµHM − kMµ
2
HM
2
)
+ (1− q − eQ)
(
αLµLM − kMµ
2
LM
2
))
−cP e
2
P
2
−cQe
2
Q
2
A project for which cP is high compared to cQ corresponds to a incremental project:
improvements aiming to reach higher market-potential are easier to make, but the probability
of technical success is diﬃcult to increase. This corresponds to γ < 0 in the original model.
Conversely, cP could be relatively low compared to cQ: this maps to novel projects, where it is
easier to work on ensuring that the project will be technically successful rather than working
toward the high market-potential outcome. By varying the cost of increasing the probability
of a high market-potential outcome, cQ, while keeping the cost of investing in enhancing the
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technical probability of success, cP , constant, we span the spectrum of R&D process types
from incremental to novel. We analyze the same contract structures and payment terms for
upfront contracting as for our previous model and plot the results in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Optimality of Upfront Contracts
(αH = 1, kI = 1.5, cP = 1.5, kM = 3, p = 0.25, q = 0)
Comparing Figures 3 and 7, we observe that our qualitative insights are robust to the
model speciﬁcations as the same contract types are optimal for similar combinations of
project parameters. An exclusion contract is optimal for large diﬀerences between low and
high market-potential outcomes. As an exclusion contract provides strong incentives for
reaching the high market-potential outcome, it is less likely to be the optimal contract choice
when the cost of increasing the probability of a high market-potential outcome is high. In
contrast, the milestone contract with innovator launch control provides a strong incentive
for enhancing the technical probability of success. Hence, it is more likely to be optimal
when the cost of increasing the probability of a high market-potential outcome is high or
when there is low market-potential variability, as this makes the market-potential outcome
less relevant. The buy-out contract is optimal for the remaining combinations of project
parameters, i.e., when the contract should induce some market-potential enhancing eﬀort,
but the low market-potential outcome is still valuable enough that it should be marketed by
the more eﬃcient party, the marketer.
8 Conclusion
R&D projects and partnerships are diﬃcult to manage due to inherent uncertainties with
respect to both successful product launch and market value after commercialization. Two
parties may bring diﬀerent capabilities to the partnership, which improves the value that
can be attained. At the same time, the inclusion of a second party raises incentive alignment
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concerns and leads to various ineﬃciencies. Any contract that governs the relationship
between the two parties should be designed to obtain the appropriate amount of eﬀort from
both and align incentives.
In this paper, we study how control rights, options and timing can be used, in conjunction
with various payment terms, to address the ineﬃciencies that may occur when innovators
and marketers form partnerships to develop and market new products. We ﬁnd that the
key factors driving the optimal structure and timing decision depends on the type of R&D
process and the variability in market potential outcomes. Our analysis leads to several
managerial implications.
Much of the licensing literature has focused on the optimization of various payment terms
within a given contract structure. We ﬁnd that it is important for parties contemplating an
alliance to consider contracting options holistically because clauses allocating launch control
or options to either party and contract timing all have an impact on the eﬀectiveness of dif-
ferent payment terms. Our analysis shows that the joint optimization of contract structure
and payment terms leads to various contract structures being optimal under diﬀerent R&D
project characteristics. Furthermore, our investigation into the timing of the contracting
decision in the presence of negotiation costs highlight that either upfront or delayed con-
tracting may be optimal. This shows that optimizing only payment terms is suboptimal and
the simultaneous optimization of contract structure, timing, and payment terms is key for
improving the value attained from R&D partnerships.
Figure 8: Mapping of Contract Choices
We identify two forces that drive contracting choices: (a) whether the innovation process
is novel or incremental and (b) variability in market-potential outcomes. In Figure 8, we
provide a map for managers entering R&D partnerships, which guides contract choice based
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on these factors. The mapping exploits the interaction of the contract terms with those
two factors to manage three distinct eﬃciency losses resulting from suboptimal R&D eﬀort,
marketing eﬀort, or launch allocation. The R&D process type aﬀects the ability of the
diﬀerent payment terms to achieve eﬃcient R&D eﬀort, while variability in market-potential
aﬀects the magnitude of the two other eﬃciency losses. Thus, incremental products with
high variability in market-potential outcomes are best assigned to exclusion contracts, which
limit distortion to marketing and R&D eﬀorts and suﬀer a comparatively mild loss due
to innovator launch in the low market-potential outcome. For novel innovations with low
market-potential variability, innovator launch control does not distort the marketing eﬀort
and achieves marketer launch with only a slight distortion of R&D eﬀort. Novel innovations
with high market-potential variability require payment terms that are more responsive to the
market outcome, thus favoring buy-out contracts or exclusion contracts. Finally, incremental
products with low variability may be best served by delaying contracting or by renegotiating
an upfront contract to avoid costly marketing eﬀort or launch allocation distortions.
This study further allows us to highlight an interesting result: the innovator may actually
be better oﬀ curtailing her rights and granting them to the marketer. First, in an exclusion
contract, the launch control right is transferred to the marketer to create a credible commit-
ment to not claiming a reward (milestone) under the low market-potential outcome, creating
an incentive to exert higher R&D eﬀort and achieve the high market-potential outcome.
Second, in a buy-out contract, the innovator allows the marketer to buy her out whenever
the project achieves high market-potential. Similarly, this buy-out payment creates the nec-
essary incentives for the innovator to exert more eﬀort to reach the high market-potential
outcome. While the beneﬁts of holding an option are well understood, this shows that giving
away an option can also be valuable.
Our work and its insights are timely as evidenced by the growing importance of R&D
partnerships (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn 2006) and the common practice of including control
rights and options in R&D contracts, as illustrated by the industry examples of Section 1. By
modeling a combination of contract payments, the allocation of control rights and options,
and timing decisions, our work yields valuable insights into the timing and structure of R&D
contracts and opens avenues for further empirical work.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
The objective function is concave in l and the feasible space is convex. The solution
described in Theorem 1 follows directly from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to
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the problem.
Formulating the Lagrangian of the optimization problem described by Equations (5)-(8)
and substituting the research and marketing eﬀort levels gives us:
α2H(1 + λ1)(l + γl) + α
2
L(1 + λ1)(γ(1 + γ)l + pL)− kM l((1 + γ)2(1 + 2λ1)l + 2(λ1pL − λ2))
2kM
Case 1. λ1 = λ2 = 0. This case occurs when pL = 0. The optimal contract is (s, l) =
(0,
α2H+α
2
Lγ
2(1+γ)kM
). This contract achieves the socially optimal value.
Case 2. λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0. This implies a contract with upfront payment s only (l = 0).
Solving the system, we ﬁnd that λ2 = − (1+γ)(α
2
H+α
2
Lγ)
2kM
. This is negative except when γ = −1.
Impossible.
Case 3. λ1 > 0, λ2 = 0. This case occurs when pL > 0 and implies a contract with
a milestone payment l only (s = 0). This yields the following optimal contract terms
(s, l) = (0,
(α2H+α
2
Lγ)(1+γ)−2kMpL−
√
8(1+γ)2kMα
2
LpL+((1+γ)(α
2
H+α
2
Lγ)−2kMpL)2
4(1+γ)2kM
). This contract does
not achieve the socially optimal value.
Case 4. λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0. This implies that (s, l) = (0, 0). No contract is written.
Proof of Theorem 2.
For both milestone contracts with marketer launch control, the milestone payment and
the corresponding contract value are trivial to determine.
If both outcomes are to be launched by the marketer, the milestone payment will be
l =
α2L
2kM
and the contract value is Ω1 =
4kMα
2
LpL+2α
2
Lα
2
H(1+γ)−α4L(1−γ2)
8k2M
. An exclusion contract
will have a milestone payment l =
α2H
2kM
and contract value Ω2 = pL
α2L
2kI
+
(α2H/(2kM )+γα
2
L/(2kI))
2
2
.
Let us compare Ω1 and Ω2:
Ω2 ≥ Ω1
⇐⇒ (α
2
H/(2kM) + γα
2
L/(2kI))
2
2
+
2α2Hα
2
L(1 + γ)− α4L(1− γ2)
8k2M
≥ pL
(
α2L
2kM
− α
2
L
2kI
)
The RHS of this expression is constant in γ whereas the LHS of this expression is de-
creasing in γ. We can ﬁnd an interior solution γˆ ∈ [−1, 1] such that for all γ ≥ γˆ, Ω1 ≥ Ω2
except when (1)
(α2H/(2kM )−α2L/(2kI))2
2
≤ pL
(
α2L
2kM
− α2L
2kI
)
, in which case an exclusion contract is
never optimal or (2)
(α2H/(2kM )+α
2
L/(2kI))
2
2
+
α2Hα
2
L
2k2M
≥ pL
(
α2L
2kM
− α2L
2kI
)
, in which case an exclusion
contract is always optimal.
Proof of Theorem 3
If kI > kM , the milestone contract with innovator launch control (contract value Ω
3)
dominates the milestone contract with marketer launch control when both outcomes are
launched. Hence, for all γ ≥ γˆ, Ω3 ≥ Ω1 ≥ Ω2. Thus a γ˜ that satisﬁes that for all γ ≥ γ˜ we
have Ω3 ≥ Ω2 and for all γ < γ˜ we have Ω3 < Ω2 would have to be less than or equal to γˆ.
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If there exists an interior γˆ ∈]− 1, 1], then at γ = −1, we have:
Ω2 = pL
α2L
2kI
+
(α2H/(2kM)− α2L/(2kI))2
2
≥ Ω1 = pL α
2
L
2kM
= Ω3,
and the region over which Ω2 ≥ Ω3 is non-empty.
Proof of Proposition 1
In the optimization problem given by equations (15)-(18) we use the constraints to sub-
stitute three variables as a function of r as follows: (a) the marketing eﬀort µiM (Equation
(16)); (b) the research eﬀort e (Equation (17)) and (c) the upfront payment s (Equation
(18)).
Note that the last substitution is legitimate because the resulting upfront payment will
always be non-negative: any royalty rate r ≤ 1 leaves the marketer with a non-negative
proﬁt in both market-potential outcomes and the upfront payment is the expected value of
the marketer's proﬁt after royalty payments leaving the marketer with zero surplus.
This gives us an unconstrained optimization problem with one decision variable, r:
Ω1 =
(1− r)((α2H + α2Lγ)2(1− r)r + kM(1 + r)α2LpL)
2k2M
Then, the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition of that problem is:
r∗ =
2(α2H + α
2
Lγ)
2 + kMα
2
LpL −
√−3(α2H + α2Lγ)4 + (2(α2H + α2Lγ)2 + kMα2LpL)2
3(α2H + α
2
Lγ)
2
=
2
3
−
√
((α2H + α
2
Lγ)
2 + kMα2LpL)
2 + 2kMα2LpL(α
2
H + α
2
Lγ)
2 − kMα2LpL
3(α2H + α
2
Lγ)
2
It can be veriﬁed that on the interval [r∗, 1] the ﬁrst-order condition is non-positive. The
second-order condition is negative at r∗.
Substituting pL = 0 gives r
∗ = 1/3. The derivative of r∗ w.r.t. pL is negative and
the optimal royalty rate is decreasing in pL. The second equation line shows that r
∗ never
exceeds 1/3.
Proof of Theorem 4
A buy-out contract with royalty rate r = 100% and buy-out price B =
α2H
2kM
is equivalent
to an exclusion contract, and a buy-out contract with royalty rate set to the optimal royalty
rate of the royalty contract with a buy-out price in excess of
r(2−r)α2H
2
is equivalent to the
optimal royalty contract. Thus, the optimal buy-out contract will perform at least as well
as the best of both.
Take Ω1 and Ω2 as the innovator's objective function without and with buy-out option.
(We substitute the marketing eﬀort, research eﬀort and upfront payment as a function of r in
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Ω2 as described in the proof of Proposition 1 thus obtaining an unconstrained optimization
problem.)
∂Ω2
∂r
− ∂Ω
1
∂r
=
α2Hr(α
2
H + α
2
Lγ − (α2H + 2α2Lγ)r2)
2k2M
The diﬀerence is positive for r ≤
√
α2H+α
2
Lγ
α2H+2α
2
Lγ
. Write the optimal royalty rate without buy-out
option r1. By Proposition 1, we know that r1 ≤ 1/3 and at r1, ∂Ω1
∂r
= 0. We also show that:
1
3
≤
√
α2H + α
2
Lγ
α2H + 2α
2
Lγ
α2H + 2α
2
Lγ ≤ 9(α2H + α2Lγ)
0 ≤ 8α2H + 7α2Lγ
Thus, at r1, ∂Ω
2
∂r
− 0 = α2Hr(α2H+α2Lγ−(α2H+2α2Lγ)r2)
2k2M
≥ 0. As the ﬁrst order derivative of Ω2 is
positive at r1, the optimal royalty rate with buy-out option, r2, is larger than r1.
Proof of Theorem 5
The innovator can set the buy-out option strike price to either B1 =
α2Hr(2−r)
2kM
and have the
marketer exercise the option in only the αH scenario or set it to B1 =
α2Lr(2−r)
2kM
and have him
exercise the option in both the αH and αL scenarios. Note that when the innovator's strike
price, B2 >
α2L
2kI
− r(1−r)α2L
kM
, the innovator never exercises her option and the two-way option
contract is equivalent to the buy-out contract characterized by Theorem 4. We therefore
investigate the case where the innovator would exercise her option which means that the
strike price has to satisfy 0 ≤ B2 ≤ α
2
L
2kI
− r(1−r)α2L
kM
. As she prefers a lower strike price, we
will set the innovator's strike price to B2 = 0. From Theorem 4, we know that it is never
optimal to set B1 =
α2Lr(2−r)
2kM
. This leaves one case for us to check:
B1 =
α2Hr(2−r)
2kM
: From the ﬁrst order condition we have r∗ = 1 as the only real root.
Substituting this into B1 =
α2Hr(2−r)
2kM
gives B1 =
α2H
2kM
and B2 = 0. This is equivalent to an
exclusion contract.
Proof of Proposition 2
1. (a) follows from Theorem 1 and (b) follows from Theorem 3
2. This follows from the innovator's optimal choice of research eﬀort which is given by:
eˆ = (1 + γ)l + r(1− r)(α2H + γα2L)/(2kM).
Proof of Proposition 3
The condition on renegotiation F ≤ α2L
2
( 1
kM
− 1
kI
) follows from the innovator's ex post
incentive to initiate renegotiation in the low market-potential outcome, namely when the
payoﬀ after renegotiation,
α2L
2kM
− F , is larger than the payoﬀ without renegotiation, α2L
2kI
.
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The optimization then follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
The innovator's contract optimization problem is split into the case in which contracting
under low market-potential is proﬁtable, or F2 ≤ α2L/2(1/kM−1/kI), and otherwise. In both
cases, the optimization follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
Following the solution procedure common for adverse selection problems we cover the
interesting case where ICH and IRL bind (Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)), which leads
to a separating equilibrium. None of the other cases lead to separating equilibria. We
can solve the two binding constraints for the contract parameters lH and lL. This gives us
lH =
((2rL−r2L)−(2rH−r2H))α2H+(1−rL)2α2L
2kM
and lL =
(1−rL)2α2L
2kM
. We ignore the constraint ICL for the
moment and check that it is satisﬁed at the end. Substituting expressions for lH and lL into
the objective function and diﬀerentiating with respect to rH gives
∂Ω(e,rL,rH)
∂rH
= −piH(e)αHrH
kM
.
Since piH(e) and kM are positive, and reducing rH relaxes IRH, the only remaining constraint
that is aﬀected is rH ≥ 0. We can therefore set rH = 0. Substituting rH = 0 into the
expression for lH gives
lH =
(2rL − r2L)α2H + (1− rL)2α2L
2kM
. (23)
Substituting the expressions for other contract parameters into the objective function, dif-
ferentiating the objective function w.r.t. rL and solving the FOC for rL we get
rL =
piH(e)(α
2
H − α2L)
piH(e)(α2H − α2L) + piL(e)α2L
. (24)
Since αH > αL > 0 and piL(e), piH(e) ≥ 0 with at least one probability strictly greater
than zero, the expression for rL is always nonnegative. Substituting the above expressions
for contract parameters into the ignored constraint ICL reveals that it is satisﬁed. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6
If the innovator were to oﬀer a menu of contracts at t=1 the ICH and ICL constraints
would remain the same as in Proposition 5 as they need to be satisﬁed at time t=4. We
denote them as ICH4 and ICL4. Similarly, we need constraints that ensure the product is
launched at time t=4, when the signature fee s is sunk, and denote them by IRL4 and IRH4.
We also need a constraint IR1 that makes sure that the marketer wants to participate at
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time t=1. This gives us the optimization problem below.
max
0≤li,s,0≤ri≤1
Ω(e, lL, lH , rL, rH , s) = piL(e)
(
lL +
rL(1− rL)α2L
kM
)
+ piH(e)
(
lH +
rH(1− rH)α2H
kM
)
+ s
s.t.
(1− rH)2α2H
2kM
− lH ≥ (1− rL)
2α2H
2kM
− lL (ICH4)
(1− rL)2α2L
2kM
− lL ≥ (1− rH)
2α2L
2kM
− lH (ICL4)
piH(e)
(
(1− rH)2α2H
2kM
− lH
)
≥ 0 (IRH4)
piL(e)
(
(1− rL)2α2L
2kM
− lL
)
≥ 0 (IRL4)
piL(e)
(
(1− rL)2α2L
2kM
− lL
)
+ piH(e)
(
(1− rH)2α2H
2kM
− lH
)
− s ≥ 0 (IR1)
First, note that when s = 0, the optimal solution in Proposition 5 clearly satisﬁes the
constraints of this optimization problem. The ﬁrst constraints remain the same. The ﬁrst
term of the IR1 constraint piL(e)
(
(1−rL)2α2L
2kM
− lL
)
is equal to zero while the second term
piH(e)
(
(1−rH)2α2H
2kM
− lH
)
is strictly positive.
This shows that delayed contracting with unobservable market-potential can never out-
perform upfront contracting with unobservable market-potential.
Second, note that this solution can be replicated by the upfront buy-out contract s = 0,
l =
(1−r)2α2L
2kM
and r =
piH(e)(α
2
H−α2L)
piH(e)(α
2
H−α2L)+piL(e)α2L
and B = l∗H − l∗L = (2r−r
2)α2H
2kM
. The L-type gets the
same contract as Proposition 5. The H type gets an equivalent contract once the option is
exercised.
Finally, as IR1 is not binding in the above solution, increasing s by a small increment
h > 0 clearly improves the maximand without aﬀecting the ﬁrst four constraints and still
satisfying IR1. The innovator can continue increasing s and improving the maximand until
IR1 binds.
This shows that an upfront full contract with a buy-out option always outperforms both
delayed contracting with unobservable market-potential and an upfront buy out option with-
out an upfront payment. This completes the proof.
References
Aghion, P., P. Bolton. 1992. An incomplete contracts approach to ﬁnancial contracting. The Review
of Economic Studies 59(3) 473494.
Aghion, P., J. Tirole. 1994. The management of innovation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
109(4) 11851209.
35
Alchian, A.A., H. Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. The
American Economic Review 62(5) 777795.
Anderson, Q. 2014. Licensing league tables 3Q14. Inﬁnata Biopharm Insight .
Bhaskaran, S.R., V. Krishnan. 2009. Eﬀort, revenue, and cost sharing mechanisms for collaborative
new product development. Management Science 55(7) 11521169.
Bhattacharya, S., V. Gaba, S. Hasija. 2014. Coordinating bilateral investments in a healthcare R&D
partnership. Forthcoming in Management Science .
Bolton, P., M. Dewatripont. 2005. Contract Theory . The MIT Press.
Che, Y.K., D.B. Hausch. 1999. Cooperative investments and the value of contracting. American
Economic Review 89 125147.
Chung, T.Y. 1991. Incomplete contracts, speciﬁc investments, and risk sharing. The Review of
Economic Studies 58(5) 10311042.
Dechenaux, E., M. Thursby, J. Thursby. 2009. Shirking, sharing risk and shelving: The role of
university license contracts. International Journal of Industrial Organization 27(1) 8091.
Edlin, A.S., S.J. Reichelstein. 1996. Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment.
American Economic Review .
Elfenbein, D.W., J. Lerner. 2003. Ownership and control rights in internet portal alliances, 1995-
1999. RAND Journal of Economics 356369.
Gans, J.S., D.H. Hsu, S. Stern. 2008. The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the
market for ideas: Evidence from patent grant delays. Management Science 54(5) 982997.
Garleanu, N., J. Zwiebel. 2009. Design and renegotiation of debt covenants. Review of Financial
Studies 22(2) 749781.
Grossman, S.J., O.D. Hart. 1986. The costs and beneﬁts of ownership: A theory of vertical and
lateral integration. The Journal of Political Economy 691719.
Hart, O., J. Moore. 1988. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society 755785.
Hart, O., J. Moore. 1999. Foundations of incomplete contracts. Review of economic Studies 66(1)
115138.
Hellmann, T. 1998. The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts. The Rand Journal
of Economics 5776.
Holden, S. 1999. Renegotiation and the eﬃciency of investments. The Rand Journal of Economics
106119.
Kalamas, J., G. Pinkus. 2003. The optimum time for drug licensing. Nature Reviews Drug Discovery
2(9) 691692.
Katila, R., P.Y. Mang. 2003. Exploiting technological opportunities: the timing of collaborations.
Research policy 32(2) 317332.
Lerner, J., U. Malmendier. 2010. Contractibility and the design of research agreements. American
Economic Review 100(1) 214246.
Lerner, J., R.P. Merges. 1998. The control of technology alliances: An empirical analysis of the
biotechnology industry. The Journal of Industrial Economics 46(2) 125156.
Nöldeke, G., K.M. Schmidt. 1995. Option contracts and renegotiation: a solution to the hold-up
problem. The RAND Journal of Economics 163179.
Pharma Deals Review. 2011. A review of deal making in 2010. (14 February).
36
Plambeck, E.L., T.A. Taylor. 2007. Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract ﬂexibility and
investment. Management Science 53(12) 18721886.
Roijakkers, N., J. Hagedoorn. 2006. Inter-ﬁrm R&D partnering in pharmaceutical biotechnology
since 1975: Trends, patterns, and networks. Research Policy 35(3) 431446.
Savva, N., S. Scholtes. 2013. Opt-out options in new product co-development partnerships. Forth-
coming in Production and Operations Management .
Schuett, F. 2012. Field-of-use restrictions in licensing agreements. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 30(5) 403416.
Smirnov, V., A. Wait. 2004. Hold-up and sequential speciﬁc investments. RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 386400.
Tirole, J. 1999. Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand? Econometrica 67(4) 741781.
Xiao, W., Y. Xu. 2012. The impact of royalty contract revision in a multi-stage strategic R&D
alliance. Management Science 52(12).
37
